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SUING BASED ON SPYWARE? ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM SPYWARE IN VIOLATION OF
FEDERAL AND STATE WIRETAP LAWS
O’Brien v. O’Brien as a Paradigmatic Case
Shan Sivalingam1
Abstract
Early in 2005, a Florida intermediate appellate court ruled
that a trial court adjudicating a divorce proceeding had
properly excluded evidence that the wife obtained by
installing a spyware program on the husband’s computer.
The court held that the evidence was an intercepted
electronic communication that violated a Florida statute
modeled after the Federal Wiretap Act. The Florida court
ruled that exclusion fell properly within the discretion of the
trial court, despite the fact that the relevant Florida statute
did not contain an exclusionary rule for intercepted
electronic communications. This Article provides a short
overview of the federal and state prohibitions on intercepting
electronic communications before examining the Florida
court’s analysis of how the spyware violated state law. The
Article will also examine the scope of the court’s holding and
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i. Factual Distinctions of O’Brien
ii. Legal Rationale for Not Adopting a Blanket Exclusionary
Rule




<1>Early in 2005, the Florida District Court of Appeal (Fifth
District) issued its ruling in O’Brien v. O’Brien.2  The court
affirmed a divorce court’s exclusion of evidence that the wife
obtained through the use of spyware that she had installed on
her husband’s computer.3  The court found that the wife had
illegally intercepted electronic communications in violation of
Florida’s Security of Communications Act (hereinafter “SOCA”).4
The court based its decision on two factors: (1) the Florida
Legislature had modeled SOCA after provisions in the Federal
Wiretap Act and (2) federal precedent interpreting the federal
statute supported a finding of “interception.”5  The court
excluded the evidence on the ground that the statutory violation
justified the trial judge’s exercise of discretion to exclude the
evidence.6
<2>The court’s holding does not explicitly create a blanket
exclusionary rule for illegally intercepted electronic
communications, but it is susceptible to such an interpretation.
Traditionally, courts have held that illegally obtained
communications are inadmissible as evidence. However, these
holdings pre-date the federal and state statutory prohibitions on
interception of electronic communications; courts could not have
anticipated the current ubiquitous use of electronic means of
communication. Moreover, spyware may provide access to
information that cannot be obtained by other means. Because
these considerations require a complicated cost/benefit analysis
that is within the proper function of Congress and the state
legislatures, courts may need to take a case-by-case approach
in evaluating whether equity supports admission or exclusion of
such evidence.
FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES PROHIBITING INTERCEPTION OF
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
<3>Federal statutes have made it illegal to intercept wire and
oral communications.7  With the proliferation of electronic
technology, the old framework for making these interceptions
required updating. In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), thereby amending the
8 2
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Federal Wiretap Act.  As amended by ECPA, the Federal Wiretap
Act (or the “Wiretap Act”) imposes criminal liability on a person
who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures
any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
oral, or electronic communication.”9  Forty-nine states and the
District of Columbia have their own wiretap statutes — many
with language virtually identical to the federal statute.10  As
discussed below, the Federal Wiretap Act and the parallel state
anti-interception statutes do not require the exclusion from
evidence of intercepted electronic communications.11
OVERVIEW OF SPYWARE
i. What is Spyware?
<4> The definition of spyware changes as fast as programmers
can develop new software. Generally, spyware is software
installed on a computer in order to monitor the target user’s
computer activity without their knowledge.12  Spyware usually
targets e-mail and chat room activity. However, spyware can
record everything the user does on the computer, including
financial record keeping, the preparation of documents in a
word-processing program, or the updating of business
records.13  Some spyware programs are used to gather personal
identifying information such as passwords, credit card numbers,
and Social Security numbers, usually for purposes of fraud and
identity theft.14
<5> Many spyware programs act like cameras, taking a picture
of whatever is on the screen every few seconds.15  These
programs may send log files of the activity to an e-mail address
where the spy can play back the sessions.16  Another significant
type of spyware captures keystrokes from the target computer,
enabling the spy to discover passwords and other confidential
information of the target user.
<6>Spyware is most commonly used in a situation where the spy
and the target have no prior relationship. A typical scenario
involves the computer user being asked to click “yes” or “no” to
some prompt in an Internet pop-up window, where either choice
results in the installation of spyware on the user’s computer.17
Or spyware may be surreptitiously installed along with a
program that the user intentionally downloads off of the
Internet.18  Spyware is used to track information — either for
marketing purposes or for more illicit purposes such as identity
theft.19
3
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ii. Direct Legislative Prohibitions on Spyware
<7> As of September 2006, there is no federal anti-spyware law.
Different pieces of anti-spyware legislation have passed the
House of Representatives but have not proceeded any further.
At the state level, as of September 2006, at least fifteen state
legislatures have adopted some form of anti-spyware legislation
and at least eighteen states are considering anti-spyware
legislation this year.20  In addition, some states have computer
trespass and or computer privacy statutes that effectively
prohibit the use of spyware.21  Thus, spyware users already risk
incurring civil or criminal liability in a growing number of states.
Practitioners should be aware of the existence of spyware
legislation in their jurisdictions regardless of how ECPA impacts
the use of spyware.
FACTS OF O’BRIEN
<8> O’Brien v. O’Brien began as a divorce action in a Florida
county circuit court.22  During the course of the divorce
proceedings, the wife secretly installed a spyware program
called Spector on the husband’s computer.23  The spyware
program secretly took “snapshots” of what appeared on the
computer screen.24  The frequency of these screen shots allowed
the spyware to record online chats, instant messages, incoming
and outgoing e-mail messages, and websites visited by the
husband.25  The spyware program apparently captured private
online chats between the husband and another woman.26
<9>When the husband discovered the spyware, he uninstalled
the software program and moved for temporary and permanent
injunctions preventing the wife from disclosing the intercepted
communications and engaging in similar action in the future.27
The court granted these motions and the husband’s motion to
exclude the intercepted communications from evidence.28  The
wife appealed this ruling to the Florida District Court of
Appeal.29
THE COURT’S REASONING
<10>The trial court found that the wife illegally obtained the
evidence through use of a spyware program because it violated
the state’s statute that prohibits interception and disclosure of
wire, oral, or electronic communications.30  SOCA imposes
criminal liability for the “aural or other acquisition of the
contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through
4
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the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device.”31
<11>The principal issue facing the appellate court was whether
or not the use of the spyware constituted “interception” of
electronic communications within the meaning of SOCA.32  By its
terms, SOCA seems to apply only to the act of capturing
communications while the communications are in transit as
opposed to when the communications have already been
transmitted. At the outset, the court noted that, “there is a
rather fine distinction between what is transmitted as an
electronic communication subject to interception and the storage
of what has been previously communicated.”33  In drawing this
distinction — a question of first impression — the Florida court
looked to federal precedent, as the Florida legislature modeled
SOCA after a similar provision in the Federal Wiretap Act.34
<12>The federal courts have consistently required that electronic
communications be acquired contemporaneously with
transmission in order to be intercepted within the meaning of
the federal statute.35  The District Court of Appeal held that the
Spector spyware program did contemporaneously intercept the
husband’s electronic communications. The court reasoned that
the spyware copied the communication during transmission and
routed the copy to a storage file on the computer. The court
distinguished this from simply breaking into a computer and
retrieving information already stored on the hard drive.36
Without this distinction, it would be virtually impossible to
violate the Federal Wiretap Act (and, by analogy, SOCA) by
intercepting e-mail.37  Furthermore, the appellate court did not
believe that the “evanescent time period, where the text image
has just become visible on the screen and the communication is
no longer in transit, was sufficient to transform a
contemporaneous interception into a retrieval from electronic
storage.38
<13>The court’s inquiry did not end with the determination that
SOCA had been violated. Neither SOCA nor the federal statute
has an exclusionary rule for electronic communications.39  Thus,
the District Court of Appeal still had to determine whether the
exclusion of the evidence was proper.40  In interpreting the
federal statute, the federal courts have held that Congress
intended that electronic communications not be excluded under
the Federal Wiretap Act.41  The appellate court’s decision turned
on the fact that the trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude
evidence was subject to a deferential abuse of discretion
standard.42  Because the evidence was obtained in violation of
SOCA, the trial court was within its discretion in refusing to
5
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admit the evidence.43
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE COURT’S DECISION
i. Factual Distinctions of O’Brien
<14>The court’s holding in O’Brien begs the question of whether
evidence obtained via spyware may ever be admissible in court.
It is useful to scrutinize and vary the facts of the case to
determine the limits of liability resulting from the operation of
spyware. The circumstances of O’Brien suggest that another
court may limit the holding to its facts. Here, a wife deliberately
installed spyware on her husband’s computer, possibly with the
intent of proving his infidelity.44  It is also possible that the wife
was trying to discover the true nature of the husband’s financial
situation in order to obtain a more favorable divorce settlement.
In either case, the wife installed the spyware with the intention
of using the information obtained as evidence against the
husband in a divorce proceeding. However, categorical exclusion
of all evidence obtained from spyware would have extremely
broad reach, and such a rule would extend beyond the facts of
O’Brien.
<15>The court in O’Brien made reference to the “[h]usband’s
computer,”45  but an interesting question is whether the wife
would have violated SOCA if the computer had been shared by
the two. The wife might then have argued that she could not
have violated the statute by installing spyware on her own
property (or shared property). Such an argument would face at
least two obstacles. First, as mentioned above, some states
have computer privacy and computer trespass statutes that
preclude spyware users from spying on a spouse’s or partner’s
computer activity, regardless of computer ownership.46  Second,
and more importantly, the prohibition in the Wiretap Act (and in
SOCA, as well) against interception of electronic communications
applies to any person who is not “party to the communication”
where no party to the communication has given consent to the
interception.47  Thus, regardless of computer ownership, both
the federal statute and the Florida statute are violated when no
party to the communication has consented to the interception.
<16>Another scenario in which spyware may be employed is in
the context of an employer-employee relationship. A business
may wish to use spyware on employee computers to ensure
that employees are not divulging trade secrets and intellectual
property, or to prevent, minimize, or deter involvement in online
pornography and gambling. Traditionally, employers have had
6
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broad authority to know how their own computers are being
used and, thus, employee privacy in work-place computers has
been subject to limitations.48  In special circumstances, courts
have gone so far as to allow a digital image to be made of an
employee’s personal computer where there is evidence that the
employee has divulged a company’s trade secrets.49  But
independent of an individual employee’s expectation of privacy,
the Wiretap Act’s prohibition against interception of electronic
communications applies to persons who are not “party to the
[intercepted] communication.”50
ii. Legal Rationale for Not Adopting a Blanket Exclusionary Rule
<17> The holding in O’Brien, excluding evidence of an
intercepted electronic communication from a civil divorce
proceeding, must be viewed in that context when considering its
precedential value.51  Whether or not an intercepted electronic
communication may be introduced as evidence, absent a
statutory exclusionary rule, is a relatively new legal issue. When
prohibited by statute, courts have focused on whether an illegal
interception of electronic communications has taken place at
all.52  Given the novelty of the issue decided in O’Brien, it is
useful to look to case law on the exclusion of other intercepted
communications in order to understand the courts’ approach to
dealing with illegally-obtained evidence. It is also essential to
note that exclusion of evidence in a civil proceeding differs in
important ways from excluding evidence in a criminal
proceeding.
<18> Generally, courts have held that evidence obtained through
illegal interception of communications is inadmissible. The United
States Supreme Court has held that communications intercepted
in violation of federal law may not be introduced in a state
court.53  Most state courts have also held that evidence
obtained by illegally intercepting communications may not be
admitted in evidence.54  However, these decisions generally deal
with interception of wire or oral communications and were also
decided before Congress enacted ECPA in 1986.55  Moreover,
the cited decisions all arose from criminal prosecutions. In
contrast to civil lawsuits, where a losing defendant faces
pecuniary loss, a criminal defendant attempting to suppress
illegally-intercepted evidence may be facing imprisonment. The
age of these cases, their criminal context, and the fact that
ECPA omits an exclusionary rule for intercepted electronic
communications counsel against a judge-made blanket
exclusionary rule for illegally-intercepted electronic
communications. 7
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<19>Also, the illegal wiretapping at issue in O’Brien was
conducted by an individual in a civil proceeding, not by the
state. Because the Fourth Amendment is not implicated in the
absence of state action, O’Brien’s conduct was illegal only to the
extent that it violated a statute or the common law tort of
privacy.56  For statutory and common law violations, especially
where the statute intentionally omits a rule of exclusion, the
need for a universal exclusionary rule is not as obvious.57  One
can imagine a scenario in which electronic communications
intercepted by spyware in violation of ECPA might be held
admissible. Such a scenario would likely arise in the workplace
context, where, as stated above, employers have broad
authority to search their employees’ computers.58  If a company
sued its employee for divulging trade secrets, the rationale for
excluding evidence of the misconduct, obtained from spyware, is
not as compelling as the Florida court’s rationale in O’Brien.
iii. Impact of United States v. Councilman
<20>When considering the potential impact of O’Brien with
regard to ECPA and its state law analogs, practitioners will look
to the most recent case from a federal appeals court analyzing
interception of electronic communications, United States v.
Councilman.59  Bradford Councilman was a principal officer of
Interloc, Inc., an online rare and out-of-print book listing
service.60  As part of its service, Interloc gave book dealer
customers an e-mail address at the domain “interloc.com” and
acted as the e-mail provider.61  At Councilman’s direction,
Interloc employees intercepted and copied all incoming
communications to subscriber dealers from Amazon.com — a
competitor of Interloc — with the hope of gaining a competitive
edge.62  Interloc’s e-mail system was modified so that, before
delivering any message from Amazon.com to the recipient’s
@interloc.com mailbox, the message would be copied and
placed in a separate mailbox that Councilman had access to.63
This intercept occurred during the e-mail transmission process,
but while each message was in a state of temporary storage.
<21>The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
sitting en banc, reversed the district court’s decision and held
that Councilman’s actions did violate the Wiretap Act.64  Prior to
Councilman, courts had held that violation of the Wiretap Act
could not occur without interception that occurs
contemporaneous with transmission.65  The First Circuit in
Councilman held that the term “electronic communication” in the
ECPA statute includes transient electronic storage that is intrinsic 8
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to the communication process.66  Thus, interception of an e-mail
message in such transient storage violated ECPA.67
<22>The First Circuit’s holding in Councilman does not conflict
with the Florida court’s decision in O’Brien. In O’Brien, the wife
could have argued that the interception of data occurred while
her husband’s e-mail messages and chats were in storage.
However, such storage would be just as transitory as the
storage involved in Councilman. In either case, a party’s actions
violated a prohibition against the interception of electronic
communications.
<23>Councilman, however, involved a criminal prosecution and
the evidence obtained in violation of the Wiretap Act was
introduced by the government. It is interesting to note that the
government may use information obtained by a criminal
defendant in violation of ECPA to the defendant’s detriment (to
prove that Councilman was conspiring to gain an advantage
over Amazon.com). Councilman thus serves as a potential
warning that the use of spyware could be a double-edged
sword. Evidence obtained from spyware will be inadmissible as
against the targeted party, but the government may use
evidence obtained from spyware in a criminal prosecution of the
spyware user.
CONCLUSION
<24> The extent to which evidence obtained from spyware shall
be admissible in court requires determinations of values that are
traditionally left in the hands of the legislative branch of
government. Here, however, Congress and the state legislatures
seem to have made a conscious decision against exclusion of
evidence derived from an illegal electronic interception, since
exclusion of evidence derived from illegal wire and oral
interceptions is mandatory. Under these circumstances a blanket
exclusionary rule is not warranted. Unless the legislative branch
affirmatively acts, exclusion of evidence obtained through
spyware may best be left to the sound discretion of the trial
court — as was the case in O’Brien.
PRACTICE POINTERS
Never counsel a client to take action that could
violate the Federal Wiretap Act or a state law
analog. Although exclusion of evidence obtained in
violation of the federal statute is not required, courts
have broad discretion in admitting and excluding
9
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evidence. An appellate court may be hesitant to
overrule a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence
that was obtained in violation of a criminal statute.
Advise organizational clients to develop and
implement computer usage policies that grant the
employer broad authority to monitor employee
computers to minimize the information security
threat that spyware poses. Ensure that employees
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